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Risk Society and Corporate Criminal Liability
Corporate criminal liability⑴ is one of the focuses of 
Amendments to the Criminal Law of People’s Repub-
lic of China enacted in 1997 (the 1997 Criminal Law), 
as can be easily seen from the fact that most articles 
are intended to extend the scope of corporate criminal 
liability and enhance punishment for corporations. 
However, notorious cases in recent two decades such 
as 2004 Anhui Fuyang Milk Scandal leading to death 
of 12 children, 2014 Jiangsu Kunshan Explosion caus-
ing 75 death and 2017 Tianjin Fire Incident resulting 
in more than 10 death, made it clear that Chinese leg-
islation on corporate criminal liability needs to be 
carefully and thoroughly rethought and reformed from 
a different perspective in order to enhance its deter-
rence effect and effectiveness.
It is widely accepted by Chinese researchers that 
China has entered the stage of risk society described 
by Ulrich Beck in 1980s (e.g. see Liu and Jiao, 2014). 
Therefore, although it has been cautioned and even 
criticized by the majority of criminal law researchers 
due to its potential adverse effects on protection for 
human rights and fundamental values of criminal law 
(e.g. see Chen, 2014; Sun, 2013), the idea of risk 
criminal law has been influencing Chinese criminal 
legislation in recent two decades, just as once pointed 
out, both modified provisions on manufacturing and 
selling fake medicines, causing major environmental 
pollution accidents and manufacturing and selling 
foods that fall below safety standards and poisonous 
and harmful foods and creation of new crimes such as 
falling to fulfil the responsibility to supervise food 
safety are direct response of Chinese criminal law to 
the question of how to manage risks in risk society 
(Liu, 2011: 16-7), risk criminal law is right a system-
atic response to a risk society, and the trend of using 
criminal punishment to fight illegal conducts creating 
typical risks cannot be reversed or even stopped (Lv, 
2013: 27-9). Therefore, it would be wise and practical 
to rethink and reform corporate crime legislation from 
the perspective of risk society.
1   Risk Society and its Challenges  
for Corporate Crime Legislation
1.1   Definition of Risk Society and  
Characters of Risks in Risk Society
The definition of risk society is usually used to 
describe the transition of human society after mid-20th 
Century. Although thought of as a natural consequence 
of industrial development after industrial revolution 
and therefore an advanced stage of industrial society, 
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risk society demonstrates different characteristics 
never observed before, which can be briefly summa-
rized as follows: industrial society and risk society 
respectively respond to first modernity and second 
modernity. First modernity is used to describe moder-
nity based on nation states, where social relations, 
networks and communities are mainly construed from 
a geographic perspective and typical symbols include 
collective life, power to control, full-time employment 
and development of the nature. Second modernity is 
noticeably characterized by five inter-related proce-
dures, namely, globalization, individualization, sexual 
revolution, under-employment and global risks (Lao, 
2014: 126). In addition, while industrial society 
stresses the allocation of wealth, the core issue and 
operational logic of risk society is the allocation of 
risk, just as Beck once said, the main force of political 
mobilization in risk society is risk itself, which will 
replace such variables as inequality closely related to 
class, nation or sex (Beck, 2004: 5). In other words, 
while continuing to be main pursuit of human being 
and a crucial foundation of social stability, the equal 
allocation of development fruits isn’t everything any-
more because the failure to justly and equally allocate 
risks and potential harmful consequences among 
social classes may also lead to complete collapse of 
society.
The risks in risk society present different charac-
ters too. Firstly, they are organized, in other words, 
they are rooted in major decisions of human being. 
These decisions aren’t made by average individuals 
randomly, but by specialized organizations, economic 
groups or political parties after careful balancing 
(Beck, 2003). Meanwhile, processes of creating risks 
are just and lawful from perspectives of science, poli-
tics and law (Nan, 2012: 150). Secondly, these risks 
usually cannot be recognized before actual harms 
occur. To put it in another way, modern risks such as 
environmental pollution, nuclear leakage and food 
safety accidents, although they eventually infringe on 
individual legal interests and even lead to massive 
destruction, exist only in chemical receipts, physical 
formulas or mathematical logics before substantial 
harmful consequences are caused. Consequently, we 
have to accept the conclusion that they don’t exist 
because a risk doesn’t exist from a legal, medical or 
technical perspective until it is scientifically proven 
(Beck, 2004: 86). It follows that we cannot measure 
these risks due to our ignorance of them (Giddens, 
2004: 195). Thirdly, new types of risks are more 
global than local or regional in risk society. Such a 
fact not only confirms the diagnosis of a global risk 
society, but also weakens or even completely destroys 
the basis of our risk management and leaves us no 
choice but accepting the fact that risks can hardly be 
foreseen and controlled (Beck, 2002: 48), as shown by 
the Fukushima nuclear incident occurred in March 
2011 in Japan, which threatens food safety and health 
of thousands of citizens not only in Japan or Asian 
countries, but also European countries of thousands 
miles away, and the Sanlu Contaminated Infant For-
mula Incident in 2007 in China, which led to more 
than 10 death and injury of thousands of infants.
The fact of the risks in risk society being of 
industrial ones and corporations being major actors in 
industrial society makes it necessary to target corpora-
tions as prevention and sanction object. Therefore, 
compulsory legal norms have unavoidably become a 
necessary tool to allocate risks to corporations and 
compel them to accept such an allocation in a society 
of rule of law, including criminal law traditionally 
considered safeguard and backup of other laws. How-
ever, it cannot be neglected that corporations, with 
their size and influence becoming bigger and bigger 
and their structure more and more complicated, are 
advantaged groups possessing capability of recogni-
tion and social resources unavailable to individuals. 
They, while harvesting profits from society, always 
make laborious efforts to use anti-science gradually 
systemized in industrial process to rebut charges 
against them and bring forward other causes and 
sources of harmful consequences to escape sanctions 
law intends to impose on them (Beck, 2004: 33). This 
has resulted in the so-called ‘organized irresponsibil-
ity’ phenomena and no one can be held legally 
responsible when risks become reality (for a detailed 
description of organized irresponsibility, e.g. see 
Zhang, 2010). Such a reality has posed serious chal-
lenges to corporate criminal liability legislation in 
almost all countries where the concept has been acc-
etped. China has been in a fast industrial process in 
recent three decades and is of course no exception.
1.2   Challenges before Law on Corporate  
Criminal Liability in China
China first adopted the concept of corporate criminal 
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liability in the Customs Law of People’s Republic of 
China amended in 1987 and then in numerous admin-
istrative laws due to the practical pressure of 
preventing increasing illegality committed by organi-
zations referring to experiences in common law 
countries. The 1997 Criminal Law lays down princi-
ples of corporate punishment in its General Part and 
specific crimes in Special Part (for the history of cor-
porate criminal liability in China, e.g. see Zhou, 2012: 
22-6). However, the development of more than thirty 
years hasn’t changed the conservative stance of Chi-
nese legislature on corporate criminal liability so far. 
On one hand, the liability of individuals directly in 
charge or responsible for conducts in question contin-
ues to be the precondition to punishing a suspected 
corporation in judicial practice. In other words, crimi-
nal liability is imputed from individuals onto 
organizations depending on whether they acted within 
their authorization with (at least partial) the purpose to 
benefit the organizations (imputed liability). On the 
other hand, the 1997 Criminal Law still sticks to a 
limited approach to corporate criminal liability, 
according to which a corporation cannot be criminally 
charged with a crime unless it is provided specially as 
a corporate one in the 1997 Criminal Law. Briefly, 
corporate criminal liability in China is a compromise 
of fundamental principles of traditional criminal law 
and practical regulation and political pressure posed 
by corporate illegality, just as what it is in western 
countries such as France, the UK and the US (Zhou, 
2012: 15-20). However, such a legislative approach 
has been confronted with considerable big challenges 
in risk society.
Firstly, as mentioned above, the risks in risk soci-
ety are organized. Therefore, to prevent risks that 
corporations may cause through criminal law means 
that we need to, depending on the threat of criminal 
punishment, force them to accept the instability and 
potential harmful consequences in their own activities. 
It has been widely recognized that it is far from 
enough to realize such a purpose only relying on the 
principle of imputed liability because it mainly targets 
individuals instead of organizations and leaves enough 
space for corporations to circumvent or minimize their 
liability without altering overall structure and organi-
zation. Meanwhile, it becomes increasingly difficult, 
if not impossible, to identify liable individuals as cor-
porations become increasingly large, decision-making 
procedures complicate and business activities decen-
tralized. In other words, the larger a corporation is, the 
higher the possibility it escapes punishment (Slapper 
and Tombs, 1999: 330). Therefore, it has been argued 
that to target corporations as prevention and punish-
ment object may be the only effective way to deter 
them from committing a crime as prosecution of indi-
viduals acted on their behalf with a purpose to benefit 
them, even if succeeded, can hardly affect ways  they 
manage and conduct business. That is, conviction of 
members of a corporation cannot eliminate the defi-
ciencies in its structure and organization that resulted 
in risks (Stessens, 1994: 518-9). To a degree, the igno-
rance of the fact of the risks in risk society being 
universal and organized implies that to restrict corpo-
rate criminal liability within traditional framework 
focusing on individual liability is itself a kind of risk 
(Lu, 2011: 25).
Meanwhile, the fact that the risks in risk society 
are unknown until they cause harmful consequences 
and are proven in legal procedures implies that crimi-
nal law cannot play a role until potential risks become 
reality because, as the majority of criminal law experts 
both in China and other continental law countries has 
repeatedly pointed out, criminal law must be based on 
individualism and moralism, and can only punish 
those who have infringed or have demonstrated urgent 
and obvious danger to infringe on rights and freedom 
of other members of a society and should be intended 
to protect legal interests (Yamanaka, 2008: 48), which 
again must be both specific and individualized 
(Yamanaka, 2008: 49). In other words, the risks poten-
tial to cause harms to legal interests and therefore 
prohibited by criminal law must be both concrete and 
realistic. However, it is definitely not a wise choice to 
punish after infringements have been caused when 
seen from the perspective of prevention and deter-
rence. What is more important, as mentioned above, 
punishment can hardly be effective because existing 
laws are directed at individuals and therefore can 
barely exert due influence onto corporations them-
selves.
Finally, that the risks in risk society are global 
implies that corporate activities creating these risks are 
global too. For example, a car that caused a serious 
traffic accident due to deficiencies in its tires and 
brake manufactured in Thailand, Indonesia and Viet-
nam might be assembled in India and then imported 
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into China by bribing a Chinese corporation, and 
bribes may be offered in the UK, the USA, Australia 
and Germany and kept in Canada. Within framework 
of extant criminal law and criminal procedure, judicial 
authorities are supposed to collect all necessary evi-
dences and positively prove guilty of the suspected 
Chinese corporation. This is obviously excessively 
hard from perspectives of cost and expertise.
Although Chinese legislature has started coping 
with adverse effects of risk society by creating and 
modifying specific crimes, it will be flowers in a mir-
ror and the moon in a pond to prevent potential harms 
in corporate activities without profoundly rethinking 
and reforming theories and laws on corporate criminal 
liability. The start point is the way of comprehending 
the nature of corporate criminal liability in risk soci-
ety, because it decides constitution elements of 
corporate criminal liability and has substantial effects 
on technical issues such as how to decide the scope of 
corporate criminal liability and how to sentence a con-
victed corporation. The fact that it is referring to 
foreign experiences and laws, especially those in com-
mon law countries, that Chinese legislature adopted 
the concept of corporate criminal liability in late 1980s 
makes it necessary to conduct a comparative study 
when the nature of corporate criminal liability is con-
cerned.
2   Evolution of Corporate Criminal  
Liability
Legislative developments in foreign countries, espe-
cially in common law countries, clearly demonstrate 
that the way of understanding the nature of corporate 
criminal liability is a changing process from strict lia-
bility to individual liability and then to risk liability , 
and this process is closely related to social changes 
stemming from industrial revolutions since 1840s.
2.1  Industrial Revolution and Strict Liability
Societas delinquere non potest (a society cannot com-
mit a crime), as the Roman maxim says. Franz von 
Liszt, a German criminal law master, also stated that 
moralische person such as universities, companies and 
colleges can never become the actor in criminal law. 
Even when all members of a company intended to and 
did commit a crime, it is still an individual one (Liszt, 
2000: 37). Continental law countries such as France, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium, refused corporate 
criminal liability in criminal law and even the Consti-
tution due to their adherence to the principle of moral 
blameworthiness and individualism in 18th Century 
(e.g. see Orland and Cachera, 1995). Prior to mid-19th 
Century, case law in common law countries also 
insisted that corporations couldn’t  be criminally 
charged because they had no soul to blame and no 
body to punish (Vazquez, 2007).
The earliest corporate crime legislation appeared 
in the U.S. and the UK in mid-19th Century, partly as 
an indirect result of industrial resolution that started in 
the UK. The first industrial revolution pushed human 
society from an agricultural society up to an industrial 
one, where corporations obtained unprecedented 
development not only in number but also in influence 
on society. While quickly increasing social wealth and 
facilitating construction of basic infrastructure such as 
railways and towns, booming corporations led to a big 
number of industrial problems that had never been 
seen in agricultural society, especially environmental 
pollution and land destruction, which unavoidably 
attracted attention of judicial authorities. English 
judges tortured by numerous illegalities committed by 
corporations firstly stated in case law in the end of 
18th Century that the time had reached to recognize 
that corporations must incur social responsibilities for 
violations of laws other than criminal law taking into 
consideration their influence on society and private 
life of citizens in various ways (Slapper and Tombs, 
1999: 27). The Regina v. Tyler 173 Eng. Rep. 643 
Assizes 1838 took a more direct stance by declaring 
that adoption of corporate criminal liability was the 
most effective way to regulate activities of corpora-
tions. This stance gradually gained support and was 
accepted. In mid-19th Century when the second indus-
trial revolution that brought human society into the era 
of electricity was about to begin, corporations finally 
became an object of criminal punishment. The Queen 
v. Birmingham＆ Gloucester Ry. in 1842 is a mile-
stone in the history of corporate criminal liability, 
because it for the very first time ruled that corpora-
tions could be criminally charged for failure to fulfil 
legal obligations, and the Queen v. Great N. OF Eng. 
Ry. in 1846, borrowing the principle of vicarious lia-
bility from tort law, imposed criminal punishment on a 
corporation for such a failure (Vazquez, 2007). This 
process clearly demonstrates that corporate criminal 
liability is actually adopted as a policy tool by judicial 
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authority to counter negative effects of industrial revo-
lution, or in other words, an indirect result of side 
effect of industrial revolution.
However, both the U.S. and the UK didn’t recog-
nize the liability of corporations for crimes requiring 
subjective elements, either intention or negligence, 
until the beginning of 20th century when the second 
industrial revolution ended and in principle restricted 
corporate criminal liability within strict liability 
offences such as failure to fulfill legal obligations and 
criminal nuisance (Allen, 2007: 250). The rationale 
behind this is that imposition of strict liability doesn’t 
require proof of intention, negligence or physical 
activities and therefore doesn’t constitute a fundamen-
tal conflict with traditional criminal law principles.
In the same period, corporate criminal liability in 
strict sense couldn’t be found in continental law coun-
tries. Japan is worthy of being mentioned here, 
because it provided punishment for legal persons as 
early as in the beginning of 20th Century. For exam-
ple, article 1 of the Law on Crimes related to Taxes of 
Legal Persons and Licensed Sale of Tabaco adopted in 
1900 stipulated that if representatives or other employ-
ees of a legal person were criminally responsible for 
illegal conducts committed during conducting busi-
ness transactions, the articles punishing the individuals 
should also be applicable to the legal person. How-
ever, because then precedents adopted the principle of 
non-fault liability, ruling that to punish a legal person 
didn’t require proof of any intention or negligence 
(Kamiyama, 1996: 274), the punishment of legal per-
sons was undoubtedly based on strict liability if seen 
from the perspective of legal persons.
The fact the punishment of corporations under 
strict liability isn’t based on ‘subjective fault’ but 
‘objective unlawfulness’ makes it clear that ‘punish-
ment of corporations’ then means corporations are 
merely punished according to criminal law, but not 
held criminally responsible for the damage they cause. 
Corporate criminal liability based on strictly liability 
is obviously contradictory to traditional principle of 
criminal liability stressing individualism and moral-
ism. Therefore, it didn’t find support in continental 
law countries.
2.2  From Strict Liability to Imputed Liability
The scope of corporate activities further extended after 
1900s along with fast development of such new indus-
tries as electrical industry, chemical industry, 
automobile industry and oil industry. Meanwhile, 
more and more illegal activities by corporations came 
into attention of the public and law enforcement 
authorities, especially environmental pollution, waste 
of natural resources, bribery, medical incidents 
because they exerted unprecedented adverse impact on 
social order and public safety. Correspondingly, how 
to efficiently prevent corporate illegality was again put 
on the agenda of the time, just as the New York Cen-
tral & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States 212 
U.S.481 (1909) once held, the law should respect 
rights of all persons, either natural or legal. But it 
should never neglect the fact that most business activi-
ties, especially inter-state business activities were 
controlled by these organizations. If the law exempted 
them from criminal liability due to the old and 
decayed principle of a legal person cannot commit a 
crime, it in fact took away from us the only effective 
tool to control them and prevent illegality (for a 
detailed introduction, e.g. see Bernard, 1984). Changes 
in attitudes to the nature of criminal liability and belief 
in criminal punishment as an effective tool of social 
control drove the U.S. and the UK to extend the scope 
of corporate criminal liability to almost all crimes 
requiring intention and negligence, including those 
traditionally considered natural crimes such as man-
slaughter, by adopting vicarious liability that treats 
illegal conducts by employees of a corporation as 
those by the corporation itself, and identification prin-
ciple that identifies high level management personnel 
of a corporation with it before 1950s, when the third 
industrial revolution symbolized by invention and use 
of automatic energy, computer, space technology and 
biological engineering started. For example, corpora-
tions can be punished for almost all offences in the 
UK, except crimes only punishable by imprisonment 
such as murder and treason, and crimes require physi-
cal elements such as rape and bigamy according to 
case law. However, corporations can be punished as 
accessories in the latter case (Smith and Hogan, 2009: 
375).
It should be noted that a number of continental 
countries gradually accepted the concept of corporate 
criminal liability due to pragmatic considerations, 
especially as a tool to strengthen law enforcement 
after 1980s too. For example, France introduced cor-
porate criminal liability into the new Criminal code in 
22
早稲田大学高等研究所紀要　第 11号　2019年 3月
1994 and has extended it to all offences and all legal 
entities with the exception of the state and local public 
organizations in exercising public authorities (Tricot, 
2014: 481). Italy also accepted corporate criminal lia-
bility into law by enacting the Legislative Decree of 8 
June 2001, the Legislative Decree No. 231, (Paludi 
and Zecca, 2014: 398). Generally speaking, both 
France and Italy adopted an imputation approach simi-
lar to that in common law countries as they also 
require the crime in question be committed by either 
an organ or a representative of a corporation. There-
fore, the principles of corporate criminal liability in 
Italy and France, although they expand the coverage 
of high-level management personnel to a certain 
degree, have shown no substantial change in the logic 
of judging the criminal liability of corporations.
Vicarious liability, identification principle and 
extended identification principle, although varying as 
to the question whose conduct can be considered as 
that of a corporation, hold the same stance as to basing 
criminal liability of a corporation on that of an indi-
vidual with a given connection to the corporation, and 
all judge corporate criminal liability using the same 
logic of first finding criminal liability of a given indi-
vidual or individuals of a corporation on the basis of a 
damage on legal interest, then proving required con-
nection of the individual or individuals with the 
corporation and finally imposing punishment on the 
corporation. It can easily be seen that the key of this 
logic is the criminal liability of the given individual or 
individuals, which constitutes the base of criminal lia-
bility of organization. In other words, these principles 
aren’t imposing criminal liability on corporations but 
imputing criminal liability of given individuals onto 
corporations depending on special connection between 
the individuals and the corporation as a media. 
Imputed liability implies that fault elements of defen-
dant corporations are in fact those of individuals, and 
principles of corporate criminal liability are still those 
applied in individual cases. In this regard, vicarious 
liability and identification principle are quite similar, 
if not the same, to the supervision-management fault 
established by a precedent issued by the Supreme 
Court of Japan in 1957, which ruled that it could be 
presumed on the basis of illegal activities of agents, 
owners or other employees of a corporation that the 
corporation failed to reasonably fulfil its responsibility 
to supervise and manage to prevent these illegal activi-
ties and the corporations could be punished as long as 
it couldn’t prove it had fulfilled its responsibility 
(Yamaguchi, 2007: 36).
Briefly, although common law countries had 
begun imposing criminal responsibility on corpora-
tions before mid-19th Century, the fact that individual 
liability is the basis of corporate criminal liability 
implies that the latter is still of individual nature. In 
other words, then legislators, although they accepted 
the concept of corporate criminal liability due to prag-
matic pressure, was still under heavy influence of 
traditional principles of criminal responsibility, which 
can be summarized as follows: the competence of a 
human being to act constitutes the basis of liability 
and imposition of liability because only a human being 
is capable of freely and correctly chose between legal 
and illegal conducts and then make a rational decision. 
And criminal law must accept that the fact the princi-
ple of criminal liability based on morally mature and 
physically healthy natural person is undisputable in 
our society (Wessels, 2008: 213). Meanwhile, it is 
because of adherence to traditional principles of crimi-
nal liability too that such continental law countries as 
Germany still refuse the concept of corporate criminal 
liability even now.
2.3  From Individual Liability to Risk Liability
As human gradually entered risk society after 1970s 
(Beck, 2003: 27-8), how to reasonably and justly allo-
cate risks became a fundamental question of social 
justice, because the idea of social justice stresses 
efforts to coordinate all forms of social allocation with 
the principle of justice (Miller and Bogdanor, 2002: 
283). The process of allocation in human society 
mainly focuses on allocation of two substantially dif-
ferent things. One is allocation of fruits of social 
development, for example, wealth, and the other is 
allocation of cost of social development such as risks 
(Wang, 2010). The concept of industrial society pre-
sumes the domination of wealth logic and alleges that 
it is compatible with risk allocation. On the contrary, 
the concept of risk society declares that risk allocation 
and wealth allocation are not only incompatible with 
each other but also have inherent logical conflicts 
(Beck, 2004: 188). Numerous industrial accidents, 
food safety incidents, pollution damages have con-
vincingly proven that wealthy corporations are 
undoubtedly one of the biggest risk sources in any 
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terms. But they aren’t assuming risk as expected from 
the perceptive of justice, partly due to the fact of the 
legislation based on individual liability being unable 
to force them to do so. Therefore, the legislation with 
corporations as main target in mind became necessary 
from either the perspective of effective prevention of 
risks or that of social justice. It is under this back-
ground that new principles of corporate criminal 
liability came into existence.
The United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Inc. 381 F. 
Supp. 730 (W. D. Va. 1974) for the first time brought 
forward a new principle intended to base corporate 
criminal liability on overall management and organi-
zation of a corporation. D, an employee of X, the 
defendant corporation, was well aware substantial def-
icits in internal procedure of evaluating drivers’ health 
condition, and B, who knew nothing about the deficits, 
followed the procedure and submitted a wrong health 
evaluation report for C, a driver who was sick then, 
and assigned C to undertake an inter-state transporta-
t ion task. C caused an accident dur ing the 
transportation due to improper health condition. X 
insisted on pleading not guilty of knowingly assigning 
an unqualified driver to undertake inter-state transpor-
tation depending on vicarious liability, stating that 
neither D nor B should incur criminal liability, because 
D knew the deficits but did not assign the driver, while 
B, although he assigned the driver, didn’t have the 
knowledge. However, a federal court ruled that a cor-
poration could still be held criminally liable even if no 
specific employee or representative had committed a 
crime. If scattered knowledge and conducts of its 
employees could be aggregated to the corporation, 
then the aggregated knowledge could be considered as 
the knowledge of the corporation and the aggregated 
conduct as that of its own. This principle, entitled 
aggregation principle by academic researchers, was 
criticized ferociously in the UK, just as once ques-
tioned, how can you get a crime by adding an innocent 
conduct to an innocent mind? Therefore, the aggrega-
tion principle has not been accepted by other 
jurisdictions so far. However, it indeed brought for-
ward a new logic of finding corporate criminal 
liability, which is fundamentally different from vicari-
ous liability and identification principle in that it, 
taking into consideration of complicate internal struc-
ture and decentralized decision-making process inside 
corporations, bases the criminal liability of a corpora-
tion on its overall management and organization 
instead of individual liability.
To a certain degree, the idea of aggregating minds 
and conducts of employees of a corporation is 
accepted by organizational liability and corporate cul-
ture. Organizational liability holds that it is 
unnecessary to prove existence of a specific criminal 
conduct in order to impose criminal liability on a cor-
poration and it is sufficient as long as a substantial 
causation between deficits in the way a corporation 
manages and conducts its business and the harm in 
question could be established. For example, the Cor-
porate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007 of the UK provides in article 1 that an organiza-
tion is liable if the way in which its activities are 
managed or organized causes a person’s death, and 
amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care 
owed by the organization to the deceased. According 
to article 7 of the Bribery Act of the UK, a commercial 
organization should be guilty if a person associated 
with it bribes another person with the intention to 
obtain or retain business or an advantage in the con-
duct of business for it, and it didn’t have in place 
adequate procedures designed to prevent persons asso-
ciated with it from undertaking such conduct. The 
aforementioned Italian Legislative Decree No. 231 
also provides that a legal person would be exempted 
from criminal liability if the management had adopted 
and effectively implemented compliance programs 
prior to the commission of the crime in question (arti-
cle 6). The Organic Law 1/2015 of Spain took very 
similar stance to Italy (for a detailed introduction, e.g. 
see Zhou, 2015).
Corporate culture is even more radical than orga-
nizational liability as it bases corporate criminal 
liability neither on individual subject fault nor on spe-
cific corporate activities, but on rather abstract 
‘corporate culture’, that is, values, beliefs and code of 
conducts that may shape thoughts and choices of 
employees. For example, according to ss. (2) (c) and 
(d) of the Australian Federal Criminal Code Act of 
1995, the fault in a corporation may be established by 
proving that ‘a corporate culture existed... that 
directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compli-
ance with the relevant law’ or that ‘a body corporate 
failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that 
required compliance with the relevant law’.
The establishment of aggregation principle, orga-
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nizational liability and corporate culture symbolizes 
the birth of true corporate criminal liability. On one 
hand, these principles, different from vicarious liabil-
ity and identification principle, lay importance on 
‘organization’ instead of ‘individual’ and separate the 
liability of an organization from that of individuals 
associated with it. Thereby, they made corporations 
criminal in real sense. On the other hand, they all base 
corporate criminal liability on organization and man-
agement activities and internal compliance culture 
instead of activities and minds of relevant individuals. 
Correspondingly, the logic of judging corporate crimi-
nal liability under these principles can be summarized 
as follows: when an infringement on a legal interest 
such as the right to life or economic rights occurred in 
a corporation, a law enforcement authority needs to 
first decide whether there existed substantial deficits 
in organization and management in the corporation, 
and then try to establish causal link between the 
infringement and the substantial deficits. If the causal 
link could established, the law enforcement authority 
could conclude that the corporation was liable. Mean-
while, it seems that procedures for individual liability 
and corporate criminal liability can also be separated 
from each other. For example, article 18 of the afore-
mentioned Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide 2007 of the UK, while excluding individual 
criminal liability for corporate manslaughter, includ-
ing aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the 
commission, doesn’t affect an individual’s direct lia-
bility for offences such as gross negligence 
manslaughter, culpable homicide or health and safety 
offences, where the relevant elements of those 
offences are made out. Correspondingly, liable corpo-
rations and individuals may be investigated and 
sentenced in different procedures.
Briefly, it is obvious that aggregation principle, 
organizational liability and corporate culture don’t 
require individual liability as the precondition to 
imposition of criminal liability on corporations any 
more. Instead, they all lay importance on their efforts 
to promote organization and management activities to 
meet legal requirements of preventing potential risks 
referring to principles of risk allocation. In this sense, 
it might be said that corporate criminal liability in risk 
society is of risk liability in nature, four characters of 
which can be briefly summarized as follows.
In the beginning, decision on liability is unified 
with that on unlawfulness and therefore becomes 
almost absolute objective in aforementioned foreign 
laws. Traditionally, the decision on unlawfulness is 
considered objective as it is based on such objective 
factors as conducts, consequences and causation. On 
the contrary, liability is considered subjective as it is 
decided on the basis of subjective factors, including 
age, mental competence, etc. However, both unlawful-
ness and liability are decided on the basis of unlawful 
state created by breaches of duties by a corporation, 
including conducts of breaching specific duties and 
harms under aforementioned risk liability principles. 
Meanwhile, the fact that the decision bases of unlaw-
fulness and liability become unified makes unlawful 
state created by a corporation the concrete basis of its 
liability. To put it in another way, intention and negli-
gence of the corporation can be presumed if it could 
be proven that ways it organized or managed at the 
moment of commission resulted unlawful state in 
question, and criminal liability can be imposed unless 
the corporation could produce sufficient evidences 
proving it had reasonably and faithfully fulfilled its 
legal duties.
Moreover, corporate crime legislation now 
intends to take a pre-emptive stance in order to effec-
tively prevent potential risks. On one hand, it has 
become an urgent policy requirement to prevent and 
sanction potential risks created by corporations 
through criminal law. On the other hand, there exist no 
feasible standards or principles to specify and measure 
these risks. Therefore, legislatures in more and more 
jurisdictions are willing to take a pre-emptive stance 
by regulating conducts potential to cause risks, as can 
be seen from the amplification of administrative crimi-
nal laws providing offences of conduct, especially 
omission, in almost all jurisdictions. For example, 
when confronted with numerous public nuisances, 
serious environmental pollution and other various 
harmful phenomena caused by fast industrial develop-
ments after 1950s, Japan adopted such a big number 
of administrative laws containing corporate punish-
ments that a Japanese scholar created a phrase of 
‘obesity of administrative criminal law’ to describe the 
then situation (Uchida, 2008: 35-8). An inherent 
advantage of administrative criminal law is that it 
doesn’t require any substantial harm in order to 
impose criminal liability, and considers a corporation 
punishable as long as it formally violates a legally 
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required duty, either by commission or omission, not 
to say of consequence, although which may attract a 
relatively heavy penalty. To a degree, it might be said 
that criminal law has become a tool of ‘controlling 
risks and managing insecurity’ nowadays (Lao, 2007: 
126).
Furthermore, to facilitate corporations to enhance 
their own capability of preventing risk becomes a 
directing ideology of aforementioned risk principles. 
One on hand, both organizational liability and corpo-
rate culture operate on a nearly self-satisfying logic: if 
a corporation had faithfully and reasonably fulfilled its 
legal duties, the unlawful sate in question wouldn’t 
have been created, and the existence of the unlawful 
sate itself proves its failure to fulfil its legal duties. In 
other words, these principles leaves narrow, if not 
zero, space for a charged corporation for defense. On 
the other hand, the primary intention of legislature is 
to prevent corporations from creating risks through 
criminal liability. As has been expounded above, risks 
may exist at every stages of legal industrial activities. 
Therefore, excessively severe liability may ‘force’ 
corporation to spare no efforts to conceal their risky 
activities and take advantage of their expertise and 
resources to circumvent liability, and this result in 
even bigger secondary harm. Briefly, as once pointed 
out, to effectively prevent risks must stress voluntary 
initiatives inside corporations (Aso, 1999: Forewords).
Finally, the principle of risk liability responds to 
the globalization of risks. As expounded above, the 
principle requires corporations to detect and prevent 
risks in their activities themselves by internal initia-
tives such as auditing, monitoring and sanctioning and 
punishes them for their failure to do so. This means 
that if potential risks are global, prevention efforts of 
corporations must be global too. It is worth mention-
ing that they don’t need to face legal barriers law 
enforcement authorities have to because internal pre-
vention efforts are part of business and management 
activities of corporations in accordance with laws and 
regulations of the country where they are conducted. 
Meanwhile, that the principle stresses cooperation of 
corporations with law enforcement authorities by self- 
reporting unlawful activities, voluntarily collecting 
and transferring evidences and pleading guilty can 
undoubtedly reduce cost and enhance effectiveness of 
law enforcement in the case of global risk.
It is right because of aforementioned consider-
ations that corporate crime legislation in recent two 
decades, while maintaining its punitive character, has 
been intending to facilitate corporations to take ade-
quate prevention procedures themselves. The specific 
approach to realizing this intention is basing corporate 
criminal liability on designing and implementation of 
internal compliance programs. Compliance programs, 
the concept of which is based on the rationale of self-
discipline, refer to internal procedures and measures 
voluntarily designed and implemented by corporations 
themselves to prevent, detect and sanction unlawful 
activities and consist of three core element: a code of 
conducts, compliance officers and a whistleblowing 
system. It should be noted that full cooperation with 
law enforcement and judicial authorities after commis-
sion of an illegal conduct such as pleading guilty, 
voluntary submission of evidences and timely imple-
mentation of remedial measures can also be considered 
parts of compliance programs. Effective implementa-
tion of compliance programs can not only function as 
a defense but also a mitigating circumstance and a ref-
erence element to a prosecutor deciding whether to 
defer or not to bring a charge (for a detailed introduc-
tion to compliance programs, e.g. see Zhou, 2015; Li, 
2015).
It can be clearly seen from the functions of com-
pliance programs that legislators intend to compel 
corporations to voluntarily take internal prevention 
procedures to realize effective self-regulation and full 
cooperation with governing authorities to jointly iden-
tify and prevent potential risks in their activities by 
increasing external pressure. Such an idea is actually a 
direct embodiment of coordinative collective action 
and negotiated social participation brought forward by 
theorists advocating the theory of risk society in the 
area of criminal law (for a detailed introduction to 
coordinative collective action, e.g. see Zhang, 2010), 
although collective action and social participation 
realized through compliance programs is to a degree 
compulsory as criminal punishment is the most severe 
legal consequence and blame.
It is worthy of being mentioned here that the idea 
of risk liability, especially allocating a reasonable part 
of the responsibility of preventing risks to corpora-
tions by imposing punishment on them for failure to 
fulfil prevention obligation, has also been considered 
even in countries where the concept of corporate crim-
inal liability hasn’t been accepted. For example, 
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Russia, where it is still a fundamental principle that 
only natural persons can incur criminal liability due to 
strong support of Russian scientists (Biriukov, 2013: 
548), imposed the obligation of developing anti-cor-
ruption measures onto all corporations by enacting the 
Federal Law No. 273 of Russian Federation (No. 273-
FZ dated 25 December 2008) ‘On Combating 
Corruption’, and allows corporations charged with 
bribery to bring forward reasonable implementation of 
prevention measures as a defense according to article 
2.1 of the Administrative Offences Code of Russia 
(Lewis, 2013). Similarly, although it still punishes cor-
porations with administrative sanctions instead of 
criminal punishment, German law also requires corpo-
rations to comply with a huge number of legal 
obligations from various legal fields, which leads them 
to establish compliance systems (Martin and Morales, 
2014: 341).
3   Risk Society and Basic Stances  
of Legislative Reforms on 
Corporate Criminal Liability
If seen from historical developments of corporate 
crime legislation in foreign jurisdictions, China is 
obviously at the stage of individual liability, because a 
liable person associated with an accused corporation is 
still a necessary precondition. That is, corporate crimi-
nal liability in China is still being confined to the 
ideology that a society cannot commit a crime and 
only their members can be held criminally responsible. 
However, social backgrounds such as China has 
adopted the concept of corporate criminal liability and 
international economic cooperation and foreign direct 
investments are increasing rapidly have made it neces-
sary for Chinese legislature to carry out reforms on 
corporate criminal liability from the perspective of 
risk liability.
3.1   Why Should China Adopt the Ideology  
of Risk Liability?
In the first place, to adopt the ideology of risk liability 
into reform on corporate criminal liability is crucial to 
safeguard fruits of economic development and pros-
perity. China saw a rapid development of direct 
investment of Chinese enterprises abroad since the 
beginning of 1980s, when China began implementing 
the policy of opening up and reform. According to the 
2017 Report on Globalization of Chinese Enterprises, 
foreign investments of Chinese enterprises have been 
on the top of the list of net export countries in two 
consecutive years, amounting to nearly USD 180 bil-
lion in 2016. What is more, statistics show that most 
of these investments went to Europe (35%), North 
America (29%) and Asian and Pacific Region (25%) 
(CCG, 2018). With the ‘belt and road’ policy being 
further carried out, the world will see even more Chi-
nese enterprises investing abroad. As mentioned 
above, a considerable number of foreign countries, 
especially OECD countries, have reformed their cor-
porate crime legislation referring to the ideology of 
risk liability. Therefore, to reform Chinese criminal 
law from the same perspective can not only make Chi-
nese enterprises familiar with necessary laws in 
making investment decisions, but also help to reduce 
risks created by foreign corporations in China, ensure 
safety of Chinese investments abroad and facilitate 
economic development.
Secondly, driving force behind Chinese laws on 
corporate criminal liability makes it a natural develop-
ment direction to adopt the ideology of risk liability. 
The most important reason that Chinese legislature 
adopted the concept of criminal liability in late 1980s 
is the pressure on social management and administra-
t ion imposed by such i l l ega l ac t iv i t i e s a s 
environmental pollution, tax evasion and manufactur-
ing and selling fake products. Continuous extension of 
the scope of corporate criminal liability after 1997 is 
also facilitated by pragmatic requirement of social 
administration. For example, the Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Con-
gress on Punishing Crimes of Fraudulent ly 
Purchasing, Evading and Illegally Trading in Foreign 
Exchange adopted on 29 December 1998 is intended 
to cope with the then Asian financial crisis. When 
criminalizing the conduct of hiring a minor to under-
take dangerous and laborious works in 2002, Chinese 
legislature clearly pointed out that it was because com-
mercial organizations that employed minors to do 
physical labor of ultra-intensity, or to work high above 
the ground or in a pit, or to work under explosive, 
inflammable, radioactive, poisonous and other danger-
ous conditions seriously caused harmful consequences 
to minors’ health and even death, and thereby aroused 
widespread public anger that the crime was created 
(Gao and Zhao, 2007: 103, 112). Similarly, it is 
because the People’s Bank of China found that a con-
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siderable number of money laundry activities had been 
performed by organizations and therefore brought for-
ward a proposal (Zhao, 2009: 316) that it extended 
corporate criminal liability to the crime of concealing 
and covering up criminal proceeds or gains derived 
therefrom. These two examples demonstrate clearly 
that Chinese legislators have adopted and then 
extended the scope of corporate criminal liability in 
order to prevent risks that corporations may create. 
This is absolutely in accordance with the ideology of 
risk liability.
Thirdly, as already mentioned above, China has 
entered risk society and Chinese criminal law has 
gradually accepted the influence of the idea of risk 
criminal law in reforms in past decades. The fact that 
legal persons are actors provided in the General Part 
of the 1997 Criminal Law side by side with natural 
persons makes it necessary to thoroughly rethink and 
reform corporate crime legislation from the perspec-
tive of risk liability. If the provisions on crimes by 
natural persons could be reformed in accordance with 
the ideology of risk liability, why should those by cor-
porations, the biggest source of risk, not in the same 
way?
3.2   Basic stances of Future Reforms  
on Corporate Criminal Liability
In the beginning, how should the scope of corporate 
criminal liability be reformed from the perspective of 
risk liability? Chinese researchers have been heatedly 
debating on limited approach and unlimited approach 
since late 1980s. Chinese legislature, although it has 
been extending the scope of corporate crime, appar-
ently adopted the limited approach, as can be easily 
seen in its restriction of corporate criminal liability 
within the scope of given crimes in the 1997 Criminal 
Law (Zhou, 2012: 42-3). As repeatedly expounded 
above, risks that a corporation may cause exist at 
every corner of its management and organization 
activities and can lead to harmful consequences to 
anyone in this era of globalization, whether s/he is far 
from or close to the place of commission. Therefore, 
corporate criminal liability should be everywhere that 
potential risks might exist, and it follows that to adopt 
the principle of risk liability means the unlimited 
approach should be preferred.
Secondly, how to adjust the basis of corporate 
criminal liability? Currently, core elements of the basis 
of corporate criminal liability in China are still those 
stressed by individual liability such as intention and 
negligence. As previous parts show, risk liability 
requires that the criminal liability of a corporation be 
based and evaluated on the way it manages and con-
ducts business. Only by this approach can the 
corporation itself be affected and potential harmful 
consequences effectively prevented from becoming 
reality. Therefore, it would be a wise choice for Chi-
nese legislature, when designing reforms on corporate 
criminal liability with the question how to facilitate 
corporations to enhance their own capability of pre-
venting potential risks in mind, to depart from 
traditional principles that stress individualism and 
moral blameworthiness and base corporate criminal 
liability on their own efforts to detect, prevent and 
sanction unlawful activities, such as whether they have 
taken prevention procedures or remedial measures and 
to what degree these procedures and measures are 
effective. From the perspective of criminal procedure, 
this means that the liability of a suspected corporation 
can be presumed on the basis of absence of internal 
compliance efforts.
Thirdly, how should the relationship between lia-
bility of a corporation and that of its members be 
rethought and reformed? Criminal liability of a corpo-
ration and individuals associated with it are usually 
handled at the same procedure as one case in current 
practice. If the basis of corporate criminal liability is 
changed, it would be necessary to separate procedures 
for a defendant corporations and individual defendants 
associated with it. On one hand, elements relating to 
specific conducts of relevant individuals aren’t deci-
sive to the criminal liability of the corporation any 
more, and their charges aren’t necessarily the same 
either. Therefore, to charge and try the individuals and 
the corporation in the same procedure may lead to 
undue delay and thereby decrease deterrent effect of 
criminal punishment. On the other hand, to handle the 
liability of a suspected corporation and that of relevant 
individual suspects can not only increase the burden of 
proof on prosecution side as they have different con-
stitution elements and judgment logics but also 
prevent defense lawyers from fully debating on the 
range and size of criminal liability of the corporation.
Finally, how to increase effectiveness and flexi-
bility of punishment? The only punishment applicable 
to a corporation in Chinese criminal law now is crimi-
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nal fine. While having such advantages as low social 
cost and the capability of depriving criminal proceed-
ings, criminal fine may lead to spill-over effect 
brought forward by Gobert and Punch (2003: 231), 
that is, when a fine is imposed on a convicted corpora-
tion, the corporation can always transfer the fine to the 
public by increasing prices of its products or services, 
and convey such wrong messages as whether to com-
ply with the law can be analyzed and measured from 
the perspective of cost-effect, and thereby lead to the 
risk of listing criminal fine as a part of production 
cost. Therefore, it is necessary to add such measures 
as prohibition to bid, order to dismiss and publication 
of criminal judgment. Meanwhile, it would be a wise 
choice to apply probation and community corrections 
to a convicted corporation in order to avoid such a sit-
uation as excessively high criminal fine resulting in 
bankruptcy and thereby causing social problems such 
as unemployment. That is, a trial court may, when 
imposing a criminal fine on a convicted corporation, 
issue a probation order directing it to promote its man-
agement and organization, compensate victims and 
reduce social harms by offering its products and ser-
vices, etc.
4  Conclusions
Corporate criminal liability in risk society is the result 
of risk allocation and therefore in nature of risk liabil-
ity. Its trends of development such as becoming 
increasingly objective and a kind of presumed liability 
intend to answer the question of how to effectively 
and efficiently manage global, organized, unpredict-
able and unmeasurable risks through criminal law. 
Meanwhile, it should be kept in mind that main func-
tion of compliance programs based on the ideology of 
cooperation isn’t to enhance severity of sanction but to 
facilitate enthusiasm of corporations in voluntarily 
taking measures to detect and prevent internal risks. 
Moreover, criminal fine, the only punishment applica-
ble to corporations in Chinese criminal law, has 
demonstrated obvious deficiencies in preventing risks. 
Therefore, flexible measures such as corporate proba-
tion and community sanctions designed for convicted 
corporations have been suggested in order to avoid 
disadvantages of criminal fine and promote coopera-
tion between law enforcement authorities and 
corporations in preventing potential risks.
Therefore, this article strongly suggests Chinese 
legislature, firstly, reform the 1997 Criminal Law and 
Criminal Procedure Law by separating proceedings 
for corporation defendants from those for individual 
defendants, so as to ensure that all sanctions and pre-
vention measures are directed at  corporations 
themselves, secondly, strengthen protection for whis-
tle-blowers, which is a decisive element as to effective 
implementation of compliance programs in order to 
avoid such a situation where most members of an 
organization, although well aware of inside illegality, 
dare not to report that has been widely proven in west-
ern countries (Morrison and Milliken, 2000: 26), and 
finally, lay down directing principles of compliance 
programs, authorize departments in charge to issue 
guidelines on designing and implementation of com-
pliance programs and encourage corporations as well 
as industrial and commercial associations to positively 
design and implement their own compliance programs 
to enhance cooperation and coordination and their 
capability of detecting and preventing potential risks.
Notes
＊　This paper is supported by the National Foundation for 
Social Sciences (Prevention Models of Corporate Bribery, 
15BFX053) and Beijing Foundation for Social Sciences 
(Current Situation and Counter measures of Corporate Brib-
ery in Beijing, 16FXB012).
⑴　Various expressions have been used to describe the crimi-
nal liability of an organization in Chinese publications, such 
as corporate criminal liability, unit criminal liability, criminal 
liability of legal persons and criminal liability of legal enti-
ties. This article is using the phrase of corporate criminal 
liability because it is used more frequently than others in 
English materials now.
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